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COMMENTS
THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION FOLLOWING ELECTROMATION
AND E.L DU PONT
I. INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly competitive and global marketplace,
traditional adversaries are finding it advisable to realign
their allegiances to achieve common goals. This is also true
of labor-management relations. Employers and employees
have increasingly recognized the need to work together to in-
crease productivity and quality for the company, thus im-
proving quality of life for the employees.' The usual, and
most problematic, form of the resulting labor-management
cooperation efforts are committees involving employees which
provide management with their expertise and perspective on
various workplace issues.2 Currently, such committees are
vulnerable to attack as unlawful labor organizations if they
are found to be dominated by the employer.
1. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PRO-
GRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LA-
BOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 7 (1986).
2. See BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE
3 (1992). Bluestone notes several of the different types of these committees
which have developed around different theories and in divers workplaces, all of
which come under the aegis of "labor-management cooperation." Id. For the
sake of consistency and in order to focus on legal rather than business manage-
ment theory, these committees will be referred to generically throughout this
Comment as labor-management cooperation efforts. For a more detailed analy-
sis of some of the theory behind the different models of labor-management coop-
eration, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN-
ISTRATION, WORKFORCE QUALITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S. AND JAPAN
(1990); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BREAu OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR THE
1990s (1988); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR
LAw (1984); ROBERT M. MARSH AND HIROSHI MANNARI, MODERNIZATION AND THE
JAPANESE FACTORY (1976); Clyde W. Summers, An American Perspective of the
German Model of Worker Participation, 8 Comp. Lab. L.J. 333 (1987).
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One response to this cooperative exception to the tradi-
tional adversity between labor and management has been a
more lenient judicial interpretation of the collective set of fac-
tors that constitute unlawful employer domination or inter-
ference with the formation or administration of a labor organ-
ization under the National Labor Relations Act3 [hereinafter
NLRA]. However, two recent National Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter NLRB] decisions appear to contradict this
nascent trend by returning to the traditional definition of un-
lawful domination. These two cases, Electromation, Inc.4 and
E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,5 pose a challenge not only to
a developing doctrine, but also to a now widely acknowledged
business necessity.
Approximately 14% of all corporations, and 33% of all
corporations with 500 or more employees, had instituted la-
bor-management cooperation efforts by 1982.6 A 1991 survey
indicated widespread recognition of the advantages of labor-
management cooperation efforts in the workplace.7 In 1993,
two bills presented to Congress revealed that 80% of the larg-
est businesses in the United States, constituting 30,000
workplaces, had "employee involvement structures."8 Fur-
ther, in June 1994, the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations issued an interim report finding that
labor-management cooperation efforts affect between one-
fifth and one-third of the workforce today.9 In several well-
publicized cases, significantly beneficial results for both the
company and its employees have been attributed to these pro-
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). See specifically 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5),
158(a)(2) (1988).
4. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
5. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
6. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PEO-
PLE AND PRODUCTIVITY: A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA 23-24 (1982).
7. See generally Brian S. Moskal, Is Industry Ready for Adult Relation-
ships?, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 21, 1991, at 18. The advantages accrue to employ-
ers through better quality, productivity and customer service as well as to em-
ployees through greater involvement in the management of the company and
the concomitant increase in control over their own destiny. Id. at 22.
8. S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3) (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(a)(3) (1993).
9. See U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS, INTERIM FACT FINDING REPORT (1994).
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grams. 10 The Department of Labor has acknowledged this
trend and "taken a strong position in support of labor-man-
agement cooperation as an important prerequisite to
America's return to preeminence in the world marketplace."
1
'
Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, is also an advocate of labor-
management cooperation programs, despite the Clinton ad-
ministration's general sympathy and support for the union
perspective which has always been generally suspicious of
the motives behind labor-management cooperation.'
2
Electromation and E.I. du Pont are viewed by many man-
agement representatives as a major impediment to the labor-
management cooperation now widely accepted as a require-
ment for successful competition in the global marketplace.'
3
Faced with the fact-dependent and ambiguous Electromation
and E.I. du Pont standards, companies tend to either elimi-
nate all labor-management committees to avoid litigation, de-
10. See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 123-31 (1993)
(discussing the labor-management cooperation at the General Motors-Toyota
joint venture and at the Saturn Corporation); BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra
note 2, at 174-79 (discussing labor-management cooperation case studies at
Corning Glass, Ford, Campbell Soup, Northern Telecom, A.O. Smith, and the
New York City Department of Sanitation); Bill Childs, New United Motor: An
American Success Story, 40 LAB. L.J. 453 (1989); Scott Kafker, Exploring Sat-
urn: An Examination of the Philosophy of "Total" Labor-Management Coopera-
tion and the Limitations Presented by the NLRA, 5 LAB. LAW. 703 (1989);
Speech by Jerry Lewis & Ernie Schaefer, Using Employee Input from Nuts to
Bolts in Building a Newly-Designed Car: The Fiero People Story, in SELECTIONS
FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL LABOR MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 63 (Bureau of
Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor)
(1985).
11. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PRO-
GRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LA-
BOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 2 (1986). Unfortunately, the Bureau does not
reach a conclusion regarding the means to resolve the conflict between labor-
management cooperation and the traditionally adversarial employer-employee
relationship under the NLRA. See also Joy K Reynolds, A Perspective on the
Electromation Case From the U.S. Department of Labor, 43 LAB. L.J. 397, 397
(1992) ("We believe that such joint efforts on the part of workers and employers
offer the best hope for improving the competitiveness of U.S. companies.").
12. Robert Reich, The "Pronoun Test" for Success, WASH. POST, July 28,
1993, at A19 (describing with approval labor-management cooperation efforts
at various businesses). The Clinton administration sanctions legislation which
would prohibit employers from replacing striking workers, a stance which some
believe is contradictory to the promotion of labor-management cooperation, "by
diminishing incentives for labor and management to resolve their differences
[which] will promote labor disputes and workplace discord." 139 CONG. REC.
S9436 (daily ed. July 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum to President Clin-
ton regarding S. 55).
13. See Randall Samborn, Quality Survives, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1993, at 31.
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spite their beneficial value, or to flout these standards alto-
gether and continue to encourage labor-management
cooperation efforts despite the prospect of litigation. 4 Obvi-
ously, a less equivocal standard is needed.
This comment examines the current standards and op-
posing perspectives on the problem of labor-management co-
operation and supports a legislative amendment to section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Part II reviews the legislative back-
ground 5 and judicial and agency interpretations of the provi-
sion,16 including the developments in Electromation and E.L
du Pont.'7 Part III analyzes the competing theories regard-
ing labor-management cooperation in the context of a variety
of proposals that have been offered from various quarters, in-
cluding judicial resolution' and legislative resolution. 19 Part
IV analyzes a proposed legislative amendment that would en-




Unions historically oppose the trend towards labor-man-
agement cooperation efforts because it appears not only to
pose a threat to their role as the bargaining unit representa-
tive, but also seemingly contradicts traditional labor law
principles. When the NLRA was enacted in 1935,21 there was
a major concern with company-dominated unions which had
begun to appear in the early twentieth century, and which
proliferated after the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933.22 Many employers created "sham"
company unions to avoid being compelled to bargain with an
14. See 139 CONG. REC. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1993) (introductory state-
ment of Sen. Kassebaum on joint resolution entitled Teamwork for Employees
and Management Act of 1993).
15. See infra part II.B.
16. See infra part II.C.
17. See infra part II.D.
18. See infra part III.B.
19. See infra part III.C.
20. See infra part IV.
21. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
22. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner on the introduc-
tion of the NLRA bill in the Senate), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY




external organization.2" The company union was perceived
as a threat to the NLRA goal of industrial peace because em-
ployer-dominated unions did not provide a meaningful oppor-
tunity for collective bargaining.2 4 Congress concluded that
employees' best interests could only be impartially repre-
sented by an independent organization.
25
The passage of NLRA section 8(a)(2)26 made it an unfair
labor practice to "dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of a labor organization." NLRA section 2(5)27
defined a labor organization as "any organization... which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers" concerning the usual bargaining issues.28 These
provisions were included to ensure that employers would not
circumvent the purpose of the newly validated labor organi-
zations and upset the balance of bargaining power estab-
lished by the NLRA. An employer was thus prevented from
acting as a "sham bargaining agent," obstructing organiza-
tion and bargaining efforts.
The first case decided by the NLRB addressed the issue
of employer-dominated labor organizations.2 9 Since that
time, the NLRB and the courts have broadly interpreted both
the definition of a "labor organization" and the standard for
employer "domination" to restrict employer evasions of the
section 8(a)(2) prohibition against domination or interference
23. See Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAw 200-01 (11th ed. 1991). In 1935, 60% of
trade union workers were members of a company union. Douglas Zucker &
Pamela Davis-Clarke, Employer-Sponsored Programs Skirt NLRA Line, N.J.
L.J., July 5, 1993, at .10.
24. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory statement of Sen. Wagner
observing that company unions make "a sham of equal bargaining power by
restricting employee cooperation to a single employer unit at a time when busi-
ness men are allowed to band together in large groups"), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
IST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 15.
25. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935), reprinted in, 2
LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2309-10. The Committee observed that
"t]he so-called 'company union' features of the bill are designed to prevent in-
terference by employers with organizations of their workers that serve or might
serve as collective bargaining agencies." Id. at 10.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
27. Id. § 152(5) (1988).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforced in
part, 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (holding that an
"employee representation plan" was a labor organization under section 2(5)
since it was created, planned, sponsored, and required by management). See
infra note 62.
229
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
with the formation or administration of a labor organiza-
tion.3 ° In order to find that a "labor organization" exists,
three elements must be met: (1) employees must participate;
(2) the organization must exist for the purpose of "dealing
with" the employer; and (3) the dealing must concern condi-
tions of employment. 31
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,32 the Court defined "deal-
ing" as a more encompassing term than mere "bargaining."33
Accordingly, even if a labor-management cooperation com-
mittee does not literally bargain with the employer, it may
still be held to be a labor organization under section 2(5) if its
actions fall under the broader definition of dealing with the
employer.3 4 Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on
this definition and subsequent case law developed a number
of different tests to identify a "labor organization," including
the subject matter of discussion, the function and form of the
group, employer intent and employee participation, and the
authority of the group.3 5 In NLRB v. Newport News Ship-
building & Drydock Co.,36 the Court indicated that a certain
degree of structural dependence of a joint committee on an
employer would constitute unlawful domination by the em-
ployer in violation of section 8(a)(2). 37
This broad definition of an employer-dominated labor or-
ganization thus limits recent labor-management cooperation
efforts whenever these efforts have any structural link to the
employer or include any sort of dealing with the employer.
Given the goal of cooperation, such interactive contacts are
30. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (affirming that
the NLRB is the body established by Congress to interpret the NLRA, subject to
limited judicial review).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988). See infra note 62 for the language of this
section.
32. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). See infra part II.C.3.
33. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211.
34. Id. at 211-13.
35. See generally Michael S. Beaver, Are Worker Participation Plans "Labor
Organizations" Within the Meaning of Section 2(5)?: A Proposed Framework of
Analysis, 36 LAB. L.J. 226 (1985).
36. 308 U.S. 241 (1939); see supra part II.C.1.
37. Newport News, 308 U.S. at 251. The Court established this standard
despite evidence that the employees actively supported the joint committee and




nearly impossible to avoid. In Electromation, Inc. ,3 the
NLRB determined that the presence of several action com-
mittees established by the employer to involve employees in
problem-solving constituted a violation of section 8(a)(2) be-
cause they were employer-dominated and because they ex-
isted to "deal with" the employer.3 9 NLRB Chairman James
Stephens wrote the plurality opinion which was accompanied
by three concurrences by the remaining members of the
NLRB. Each concurrence presented a different perspective
on the majority's enforcement of the traditional two-part test
(domination/labor organization), and each emphasized the
importance of labor-management cooperation efforts in the
workplace and of allowing for greater latitude for their
support. 40
Despite this apparent diversity of perspective throughout
the NLRB, the Electromation case was not an aberration. In
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,41 the NLRB again held that
several action committees created by the employer were labor
organizations because they were "dealing" with the employer
in a way that did not fall into any of the narrow exceptions
since they functioned to make group proposals to the em-
ployer rather than as individual communication devices. 42 In
E.I. du Pont, the NLRB made no effort to limit the definition
of the "dealing" which constitutes a labor organization,
although it did provide a clearer explanation of the activities
that constitute "dealing." Once again, NLRB Member Dennis
M. Devaney concurred but wrote separately to emphasize
that "the Board should focus enforcement of the provision on
the specific evils" targeted by Congress, while otherwise leav-
ing employers free to interact with their employees to effect
labor-management cooperation. 43  The primary evil ad-
dressed by the NLRA is industrial strife, but the specific goal
of section 8(a)(2) is ensuring impartial representation.
38. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation,
Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994); see supra
part II.D.1.
39. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 997.
40. Id. at 998-1015 (Devaney, M., Oviatt, M., and Raudabaugh, M.,
concurring).
41. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993); see supra part II.D.2.
42. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895.
43. Id. at 899 (Devaney, M., concurring).
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B. Legislative History of the NLRA
The NLRA was enacted in 1935 to eliminate industrial
warfare occasioned by the unfair balance of power between
employers and employees by establishing a framework within
which conflicts could be resolved.4 4 To accomplish this pur-
pose, the NLRA established the rights of employees to organ-
ize and bargain collectively with employers. 45 The company
union was recognized as one of several threats to the balance
of power and concomitant employee rights.4 6
Ironically, the concept of company unions was first intro-
duced in the early part of the twentieth century by reformers
seeking, for philosophical or religious reasons, to democratize
the workplace and make it more productive. 4 7 With the in-
creasing strength and numbers of organized labor, some busi-
44. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935) ("The first objective
of the bill is to promote industrial peace."), reprinted in 2 LEGis. HiST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 2300; see also S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., title 1, § 2 (1934),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 1 (stating purpose of bill is
to encourage "the equalization of bargaining power of employers and employ-
ees, [and provide] agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes").
45. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(amended by ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947)) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988)). Section 7 provided that "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or
protection." Id.
46. Senator Wagner viewed the company union as the most significant
threat to the goals of the NLRA. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory state-
ment of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 15-
18 (1949).
47. See generally SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT 124-25 (1964). As
the title of this book suggests, there has been an ongoing American obsession
with the twin goals of commercial efficiency and industrial democratization.
The prime example of the former goal is Frederick W. Taylor's theory of"scien-
tific" industrial management which envisioned the workplace (viz., the factory)
as one great machine wherein maximum efficiency was achieved by scientific
systemization of tasks, streamlining of tools and procedures, and the provision
of incentives by management, id. at 21-26, resulting in a "radical separation of
thinking from doing," id. at 24. Variations on the theory of scientific manage-
ment, notably by Henry Ford, developed throughout the 1910's and 1920's. Id.
at 160-67. However, the best recognized aspect of Taylorism today is its impact
on industrial democratization. Id. at 167. Various theories of industrial democ-
ratization developed alongside Taylorism but posited that improving the condi-
tion of the individual employee would have the effect of greater commercial effi-
ciency while Taylorism relied on the work ethic to improve the human
condition. Id. at 20. Theories of industrial democracy were based on religious
and social motives, as well as more practical motives such as fending off trade
unions. Id. at 124-25.
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nesses instituted company unions, ostensibly to appease their
workforces while still maintaining control over the means of
labor organization. 48 During World War II, the War Labor
Board encouraged the formation of employee committees to
increase efficiency and productivity. These were established
and operated under management control, and some contin-
ued to function after the War Labor Board authorization
ceased.49
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 contained
the prototype for section 7 of the NLRA. 50 Employers refash-
ioned their company unions to comply with the new law by
eliminating the appearance of management presence on the
committees, even though management still created these em-
ployee representation committees and thus continued to exer-
cise considerable power.51 Further, there was a marked in-
crease in the number of company unions, as many non-
organized employers sought to avoid being forced to deal with
an external organization. 2 In 1933, 45% of employees were
"represented" by company unions while only 9.3% of employ-
ees were dealing with employers through trade unions.
53
1. NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) 54 was enacted specifically to counteract
the evils associated with company unions and employee rep-
48. See generally ERNEST R. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION (1926);
CARROLL E. FRENCH, THE SHOP COMMITTEE IN THE UNITED STATES (1923).
49. See RUSSELL A. SMITH ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW 115 (7th ed. 1984).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) includes § 7(a) National Industrial Recovery Act
provisions that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization [and to]
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing," free from employer interference, coercion or restraint. 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
Cf. supra note 45.
51. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (Mar. 11, 1934 New York Times article
by Sen. Wagner included in the record), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 23; see also Cox, supra note 23, at 200-01.
52. See National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1935)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22,
at 1416.
53. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (Mar. 11, 1934 New York Times article
by Senator Wagner included in the record), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 23.
54. The section provides that,
It shall be an unlawful labor practice for an employer (2) to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organi-
zation or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That
233
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resentation committees.5 5 Such employer constructs
threatened the balance of power established through the col-
lective bargaining framework by implementing spurious rep-
resentation which was not in the employees' best interests. 56
The original draft of this provision made it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "initiate, participate in, supervise,
or influence the formation, constitution, bylaws, other gov-
erning rules, operations, policies or elections of any labor or-
ganization."57 The provision was later modified to allow em-
ployees to "confer with [the employer] during working hours
without loss of time or pay" based upon testimony at the Con-
gressional hearings that certain unaffiliated employee orga-
nizations confined to representing employees on a single em-
ployer basis often operated in an amicable and cooperative
atmosphere."
The phrase "to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration" was substituted for the more inclusive
original language upon recognition that an employer might
initiate a labor organization amongst its employees without
posing a threat to its employees' freedom of choice of a bar-
gaining representative. 59 Although the formative stage of or-
ganization was viewed as most susceptible to interference by
subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pur-
suant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay.
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2) (1988).
55. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1935), reprinted in 2
LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2309-10.
56. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 15; see also Labor Disputes
Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1935)(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 2489. "Collective bargaining becomes a sham when the em-
ployer sits on both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the spokesman
of those with whom he is dealing." Id.
57. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(3) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-
NLRA, supra note 22, at 3.
58. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2309.
59. See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Com-
mittee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner,
explaining that the focus should be on whether or not the organization itself is
"independent of the employee-employer relationship"), reprinted at 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2489.
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the employer, 60 an employer's mere suggestion that its em-
ployees organize (thus "initiating" a labor organization) did
not rise to the level of "domination" and "interference."
61
Thus, section 8(a)(2) was narrowed somewhat from its origi-
nal sweeping scope to acknowledge realistic communications
between labor and management, without eliminating restric-
tions against sham bargaining and similar representative
efforts.
2. NLRA Section 2(5)
An understanding of the term "labor organization" in sec-
tion 8(a)(2) is essential to the analysis of employer domina-
tion. However, section 2(5)62 is not entirely enlightening on
its face and reference to the legislative history of the provi-
sion is necessary. The term "labor organization" was broadly
defined to generically incorporate any group which could con-
ceivably serve as a bargaining representative for employ-
ees. 63 The NLRB was given wide latitude to interpret the
NLRA provisions, subject to judicial review, and thus to fur-
ther refine the definition. 64 Senator Wagner himself empha-
sized that "nothing in the measure discourages employees
from uniting on an independent- or company-union basis, if
by these terms we mean simply an organization confined to
the limits of one plant or one employer. Nothing in the bill
60. "Such interferences exist when employers actively participate in fram-
ing the constitution or bylaws or labor organizations." S. REP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HisT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at
2309.
61. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., 1ST
SESS. (1935), COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONGRESS) AND S. 1958 (74TH CON-
GRESS) 27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22,
at 1352.
62. This section provides that,
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
63. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2306.
64. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (affirming that
the NLRB is the body established by Congress to interpret the NLRA).
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prevents employers from maintaining free and direct rela-
tions with their workers ....
The term "labor organization" was originally defined as,
"any organization, labor union, association, corporation, or
society of any kind in which employees participate to any de-
gree whatsoever, which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment."66
However, the final Act was re-worded to include a specific ref-
erence to a common form of employer-dominated unions: the
employee representation committee.6 7 The "employee repre-
sentation committee" was a familiar form of company-domi-
nated union in 1935, and was the specific type of organization
which section 8(a)(2) was enacted to enjoin.68
Thus, this definition requires three elements: (1) an or-
ganization, agency, or employee representation committee or
plan; (2) employee participation; and (3) the purpose of deal-
ing with employees concerning mandatory bargaining sub-
jects. An organization existing for other purposes would not
qualify as a labor organization under the NLRA. Thus, it was
observed that certain types of employer-employee communi-
cation, not otherwise outlawed, were lawful, since the goal of
the NLRA was to "remove from the industrial scene unfair
pressure, not fair discussion."69 Further, it was recognized
that employees were under no obligation to exercise their sec-
tion 7 rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, in
which case any labor-management cooperation effort might
65. 79 CONG. REC. 2368 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HiST.-NLRA, supra
note 22, at 1312-13.
66. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., title 1, § 3(5) (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2.
67. See To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1934)
(statement of Edwin E. Witte, Labor Expert), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HiST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 271.
68. See STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74TH
CONG., 1ST SEss. (1935), COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73d CONGRESS) AND S. 1958
(74TH CONGRESS) 27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 1352.
69. S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-
NLRA, supra note 22, at 1104. "[Tlhese abuses do not seem.., so general that
the Government should forbid employers to indulge in the normal relations and
innocent communications which are part of all friendly relations between em-
ployer and employee." Id.
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be lawful, regardless of the amount of employer domination
involved.7"
3. The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA
In 1947, the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act. 71 The overriding concern of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments was the rapidly expanding power of the unions.72
Among the proposed provisions was one that would have al-
lowed the formation of employee committees by an employer
for discussion of the usual bargaining subjects even if the em-
ployees had no bargaining representative. 73 Instead, the fi-
nal version amended NLRA section 9(a).74 The initial propo-
sal was rejected as redundant since the NLRA did not
70. Section 7 includes the right to refrain from exercising employee rights
under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). See also To Create a National Labor
Relations Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), re-
printed in, 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 39:
Let me make it absolutely clear that the bill does not in any way im-
pair the rights of employees to organize on the single employer or com-
pany union basis, if that is their desire. It simply forbids employers to
force development along such lines alone, and prevents them from
dominating their workers when the workers desire a company union.
Id.
71. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, title I, § 101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended.
72. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Ch. 120, title 1,
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 2 (1947) [hereinafter LEGis.
HIST.-LMRA]. See also Cox, supra note 23, at 93-94. The introductory report
for this legislation cataloged a number of abuses to which employees and em-
ployers had been subject since the passage of the NLRA in 1935 at the hands of
unions and urged the passage of legislation to reestablish an equitable balance
of power in the workplace. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, at 295-96 (1947).
73. The relevant provision reads as follows:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act:
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of em-
ployees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, includ-
ing grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working
conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not
recognized a representative as their representative under section
9.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-
LMRA, supra note 72, at 56.
74. Section 9(a) allows employers to adjust grievances presented to them by
employees, "as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
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explicitly prevent employees from meeting with their em-
ployer, and the revision to section 9(a) conceded to employers
the capacity to answer employee grievances.7 5 Thus, even in
1947, twelve years after the passage of the NLRA, there was
still a pronounced concern about company unions and
preventing their resurgence. 76 Although the Taft-Hartley
amendment did not affect the definition of a labor organiza-
tion,77 and attempts to specifically amend section 8(a)(2) were
rejected, 78 the scope of lawful employer-employee communi-
cations was slightly expanded by allowing employers to re-
spond to their employees' grievances.
4. Summary
Although Congress enacted section 8(a)(2) to address the
prevalent threat to industrial peace imminent in the contin-
ued existence of company unions, specifically employee repre-
sentation committees, section 8(a)(2) still appeared to allow
some limited room for employee-employer communications.
This is suggested by both the modifications to the original
Wagner Act and by the Taft-Hartley amendments.
C. Judicial and Agency Interpretation
1. NLRA Section 8(a)(2)-Newport News and
Employer Domination
The Supreme Court ruled early and only once, in NLRB
v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,19 on whether
employee committees violate section 8(a)(2) prohibitions
against domination and interference. In Newport News, the
employer had established an employee committee in 1927 in
cooperation with its employees in order to "give employees a
voice in respect of the conditions of their labor and to provide
a procedure for the prevention and adjustment of future dif-
That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
75. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted
in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 549.
76. H.R. MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 376.
77. See id. at 33, reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 537.
78. See 93 CONG. REC. S6600 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 1539.
79. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
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ferences." ° Several joint committees, composed of five repre-
sentatives elected by the employees and five representatives
selected by management (none of whom were supervisors),
administered the plan."' Management's representatives
were "to keep the management in touch with the representa-
tives and represent the management in negotiations with
their officers and committees."
82
The plan was amended several times to consolidate the
committees, but retained an equal number of representatives
from both management and the employees.83 In 1937, after
the validity of the NLRA had been sustained by the Supreme
Court, the plan was revised, on approval of employees and
management.84 The revised plan eliminated payment of com-
pensation to the elected representatives, and established an
"Employees' Representation Committee" composed solely of
employees in place of the bipartisan committee, the actions of
which were final on approval by the company.85 A poll of the
employees revealed an overwhelming majority approval of
the plan as revised.8 6
The Court concurred with the findings of the NLRB that,
despite the 1937 revisions, the organization had historically
been dominated and controlled by the employer and that the
purpose of section 8(a)(2) could only be achieved by the dises-
tablishment of the committee.87 Having made this finding,
the Court did not reach the issue of whether the committee,
as revised, was in compliance with section 8(a)(2).8 8 The
NLRB decision designated various contentions made by the
employer regarding the revised committee as irrelevant. In-
stead, the NLRB concentrated on the fact that management
approval was still necessary for committee action to be effec-
tive or to amend the plan, which led the NLRB to the conclu-
sion that the employer still unlawfully dominated the com-
80. Id. at 244.
81. Id. at 244-45.
82. Id. at 245.
83. Id.
84. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 246
(1939).
85. Id. at 246-47.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 251.
88. Id. at 250. The Court passed on the issue of whether the committee was
a labor organization, not whether the committee had been dominated. Id. at
251 (1939).
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mittee.8 9 The Court approved the NLRB's disestablishment
order and failed to reach the issue of whether the revised
committee was legal.90 The Court concluded that "it was for
Congress to determine whether, as a matter of policy, such a
plan should be permitted to continue in force."91
2. Alternative Interpretations of Section 8(a)(2)
Domination
Not all the circuit courts have followed Newport News.
One line of interpretation has relaxed the standard for find-
ing domination to allow for the possibility of labor-manage-
ment cooperation. 92 This interpretation requires that actual
(as opposed to inferred) domination be found to demonstrate
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(2), 93 and proposes
a subjective test from the employees' standpoint to determine
the existence of domination.94 One court stated, "[a] line
must be drawn ... between support and cooperation. Sup-
port, even though innocent, can be identified because it con-
stitutes at least some degree of control or influence. Coopera-
tion only assists the employees or their bargaining
representative in carrying out their independent intention."95
This interpretation has been followed and expanded
upon in other circuit courts. 96 The subjective test continues
89. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241,249
(1939).
90. Id. at 250.
While men are free to adopt any form of organization and representa-
tion whether purely local or connected with a national body, their pur-
pose so to do may be obstructed by the existence and recognition by the
management of an old plan or organization the original structure or
operation of which was not in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Id.
91. Id. at 251.
92. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1955).
The court noted that "[nleither mere cooperation, preference nor possibility of
control constitute unfair labor practices; and the Board may not infer conduct
that is violative of the Act from conduct that is not, unless there is a substantial
basis, in fact or reason, for that inference." Id. at 168.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. The Chicago Rawhide court also laid a heavy emphasis on the mo-
tives of the employer. Id. at 167.
95. Id.
96. See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984);
NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles
v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Mod-
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to require that the employer has actually interfered with and
dominated the employees' freedom of choice and the test for
this interference remains subjective, from the employees'
point of view.97 Later cases have gone further, however, re-
quiring a more objective demonstration of actual domination
such as a showing of anti-union bias and active domination by
the employer in addition to the subjective test.98 Even the
NLRB allowed for the possibility of modern labor-manage-
ment cooperation by providing a slightly more relaxed test
under certain circumstances. 99
3. NLRA Section 2(5)-Cabot Carbon and the
Definition of a Labor Organization
The Supreme Court's definition of a "labor organization,"
for the purpose of determining whether an employee commit-
tee is an unlawful "labor organization" violative of section
8(a)(2), is set out in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. ' 00 In Cabot
Carbon, the employer established an employee committee at
each of its plants pursuant to a suggestion of the War Produc-
tion Board in 1943.101 The stated purpose of the committees
was to provide a forum for employees' views and problems of
mutual interest to employees and management. 102
Working with employee representatives, the employer
prepared bylaws, stating the duties and functions of the com-
mittees, subject to the approval of the employees establishing
those committees.10 3 The bylaws also determined the
ern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v.
NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957).
97. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
98. Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967). The
court held that "[the Board must prove that the employer's assistance is actu-
ally creating Company control over the union before it has established a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(2)." Id. The Modern Plastics court also maintained that the
purpose of the NLRA was to encourage cooperation and that industrial peace
was merely a "prime purpose" of the NLRA, fostered through collective bargain-
ing. Id.
99. The NLRB found no domination, only unlawful assistance, under a
slightly relaxed totality of circumstances test, where the employees determined
the structure and formation of the committee. Duquesne Univ., 198 N.L.R.B.
891, 893 (1972).
100. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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number of employees on each committee and their terms, the
election procedure, the meeting times, and the grievance pro-
cedure, and established that employees would be paid for
time served on the committees.10 4 The committees had no
dues and the employer paid all the expenses. 10 5 With the ad-
vent of NLRB certified labor organizations at many of the
plants, the committees' functions were effectively reduced to
efficiency, production and grievance issues.
10 6
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' holding
that the committees were not labor organizations because
they did not bargain with the employers, but instead held
that section 2(5) expanded the definition of "labor organiza-
tion" by use of the word "dealing" to include more than mere
bargaining. 10 7 The Court concluded that the committees'
grievance procedure came within the ambit of "dealing" and
that the proposals made by the committees to management
related to conditions of work as well as several of the specific
bargainable issues listed in section 2(5). 108 The Court ob-
served that a (lawful) independent labor organization would
have the power to insist on its proposals, whereas an (unlaw-
ful) company-dominated labor organization would not. 10 9
Therefore, if an employee committee exists "in part at least"
to deal with the employer on grievances and bargaining sub-
jects, it is an unlawful labor organization if the employer ex-
ercises direct control over it. 110
The NLRB has consistently followed this definition of "la-
bor organizations" in finding various committees violative of
section 8(a)(2). 1 1 Each case demonstrates some combination
of factors indicating a lack of structural independence from
the employer. These factors include a lack of significant em-
ployee input into the function and formation of the commit-
tees, and employer control of the composition of the commit-
104. Id. at 205-06.
105. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. "03, 209 (1959).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 211-13.
108. Id. at 213-14.
109. Id. at 214.
110. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1959).
111. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 405 (1987); Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1486, 1492 (1978); Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 334 (1970),
enforced, 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 999, 1002-
03 (1968); Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1520, 1530-31 (1964), enforced in part, 357
F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1966).
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tees and the topics of discussion, as well as holding
committee meetings on company time, on company premises,
at the employer's convenience, with at least one member of
management present. 112 Furthermore, these committees dis-
cussed and presented proposals to management regarding
terms and conditions of employment. 113 Although each com-
mittee was formed for an ostensibly neutral purpose,1 4 and
given names evoking a cooperative venture, 15 in each case
the committee's formation coincided with a union's recogni-
tion campaign.1 The NLRB's broad interpretation of "deal-
ing" has generally been accepted in the circuit courts.
1 17
4. Alternative Interpretations of Section 2(5) Labor
Organizations
Two Sixth Circuit Court cases departed abruptly from
the NLRB/Cabot Carbon standards. In NLRB v. Streamway
Division of Scott & Fetzer Co., 1 18 the court held that a mixed
employee-management committee designed to improve com-
munications between management and employees, although
dominated by the employer, was not a section 2(5) labor or-
112. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402; Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at
1492; Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 333; Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
at 1002; Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. at 1530-31.
113. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 403; Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at
1496; Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 333; Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
at 1002; Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. at 1530.
114. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402 (improving quality of work life);
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 334 (serving as an oral suggestion box);
Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B. at 1001-02 (advising management on working
conditions and unjust practices).
115. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402 (employee action committee); Lib-
erty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1492 (management advisory committee); Clap-
per's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 332 (Employees' Committee); Grafton Boat Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (Labor-Management Committee); Ambox, Inc., 146
N.L.R.B. at 1530 (Employee-Management Relations Council).
116. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 402 (1987); Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1486, 1492-93 (1978); Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 326
(1970), enforced, 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
999, 1003 (1968); Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1520, 1528-29 (1964), enforced in
part, 357 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1966).
117. See NLRB v. Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289
F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
118. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
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ganization and thus did not violate section 8(a)(2). 119 The
goal of the committee was to serve as a communication device
between management and labor regarding the company's
plans and programs, and to identify operational problem ar-
eas, and possible solutions. 120 While observing that the term
"dealing" was broadly defined by Congress and by the Cabot
Carbon Court for the purpose of preventing not only company
unions but also other sham mechanisms purporting to repre-
sent employees, the court determined that the amount of in-
teraction which constituted "dealing" was still an open
question. 121
The court also followed the view that the adversarial
model of employer-employee relations is an "anachronism,"
and that management ought to be able to communicate with
employees.' 22 Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
demonstrated its willingness to "reject a rigid interpretation
of the statute and consider whether the employer's behavior
fosters employee free expression and choice as the Act re-
quires.1 2 3 One consideration in finding that the committee is
not a labor organization is the continuous rotation of em-
ployee members to allow for maximum participation.
1 24
Thus, the committee is less a representational body for the
employee population than a forum for individual communica-
tion with management. Other considerations included the
lack of anti-union animus or other evidence of employer's in-
tent to stall an organizational drive or assume the union's du-
119. Id. at 294-95.
120. Id. at 289. The company clearly dominated the Committee by establish-
ing it, and setting its agenda and structure, id., and the court acknowledged
that "there is little question that if it is a 'labor organization' under section 2(5)
of the Act, the Committee was dominated by the Company." Id. at 291.
121. Id. at 291-92. The court also tried to distinguish Cabot Carbon on its
facts because it involved "a more active, ongoing association between manage-
ment and employees, which the term dealing connotes, than is present here."
Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 293.
123. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th
Cir. 1982). "An overly broad construction of the statute would be as destructive
of the objects as [sic] the Act as ignoring the provision entirely." Id. at 292. "It
erects an iron curtain between employer and employees, penetrable only by the
bargaining agent of a certified union, if there is one, preventing the develop-
ment of a decent, honest, constructive relationship between management and
labor." Id. (quoting NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
124. Id. at 294-95.
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ties, and the lack of general recognition that the committee
was a labor organization. 1
25
In Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 126 the employer formed the
"President's Advisory Council," composed of elected repre-
sentatives, as a forum for discussion of various problematic
employment issues, at approximately the same time as an or-
ganizational drive was underway. 127 Once again, the em-
ployer clearly dominated the labor-management council.
128
However, following the Streamway "communication device"
theory, the court held that the Council was not a "labor or-
ganization," especially since the employer took no action re-
garding employee complaints during the course of the union
campaign, and thus did not adversely affect the campaign.
1 29
In summary, "not all management efforts to communicate
with employees concerning company personnel policy are for-
bidden on pain of violating the Act." 13 0
5. NLRB-Sanctioned Exceptions to the Section 2(5)
Labor Organization
The NLRB has also recognized two rare exceptions to the
section 2(5) labor organization rule, where employee commit-
tees exist without dealing with the employer. In General
Foods Corp.,13 1 the (then non-unionized) employer estab-
lished job enrichment "teams" composed of the entire bar-
gaining unit to discuss operational issues. 132 The NLRB ac-
cepted that the "teams" were not established to head off
organizational drives but rather in response to behavioral
psychology studies so as to provide employees with greater
involvement in the workplace. 133  Although the teams dis-
cussed conditions of employment, the NLRB held they were
not "labor organizations" for two reasons: first, the employer's
125. Id. at 295.
126. 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 1294.
128. Id. Although employees elected their own representatives, Airstream
formed the Council, set its agenda, and meetings took place on company time
for which employees were paid. All this coincided with the organizational drive
and addressed many of the same issues raised by the union. Id.
129. Id. at 1297-98.
130. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 292 (6th
Cir. 1982).
131. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
132. Id. at 1233.
133. Id. at 1232, 1234.
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motive for establishing the committees "had nothing to do
with labor relations;" 13 4 and second, there was no proper
agency relationship of the organization to the employees on
whose behalf it was called upon to act since the entire bar-
gaining unit comprised the membership of the teams.
135
Thus, where all of a company's employees are part of a labor-
management cooperation effort, the group is not "dealing"
with the employers.
The second exception developed by the NLRB to the
broad definition of "dealing" concerns the delegation of mana-
gerial responsibilities. In Spark's Nugget, Inc., 36 the Em-
ployees' Council performed a purely adjudicatory function,
resolving employees' grievances, and did not interact with
management for any purpose other than to render a final de-
cision on the grievance. 137  In Mercy-Memorial Hospital
Corp., the Employees' Grievance Committee was created
solely to give employees a voice in resolving the grievances of
their fellow employees and thus did not "deal" with the em-
ployer.1 39 Thus, where a committee maintains some in-
dependent jurisdiction, separate from management, it is not
held to be "dealing" with management.
6. Summary
The current standards for lawful labor-management
committees are ambiguous at best. The Sixth Circuit Court
challenged the objective Newport News domination standard
on the theory that a distinction can feasibly be made between
actual domination and lawful labor-management cooperation
by use of a subjective test of employer motive and employee
134. The NLRB noted that "[iun their essence, the teams, and each of them,
are nothing more or less than work crews established by Respondent as admin-
istrative subdivisions of its entire employee complement." Id. at 1234.
135. Id. The NLRB remarked, "an entire bargaining unit, viewed as a 'com-
mittee of the whole,' has never been accorded de facto labor organization sta-
tus." Id.
136. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part sub. nom. NLRB v. Silver
Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
137. Id. at 276 (noting that the Council did not so much deal with manage-
ment as it dealt for management in performing a management function).
138. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
139. Id. at 1121 (finding that the presence of a management representative
of the grievant's choice on the Committee was not indicative of 'dealings' with




approval. Cabot Carbon's broad definition of a "labor organi-
zation," which effectively could be manipulated to encompass
almost any type of employee committee, has been revised by
the NLRB. The revised definition allows exceptions for com-
mittees that do not act as agents of the employees, that is, in
a representative capacity, and for committees which have au-
thority independent from the employer. The objective Cabot
Carbon standard has also been challenged by a subjective
test in the Sixth Circuit which recognizes that while em-
ployer domination may be objectively ascertainable, the iden-
tification of a labor organization requires reference to subjec-.
tive factors.
D. Electromation and E.I. du Pont: The NLRB Rules on
the Legality of Cooperation Committees
1. Electromation
In Electromation,140 the company, a (then) non-unionized
electronic components manufacturer employing approxi-
mately 200 persons, experienced financial losses and created
five action committees 141 as a means of involving employees
in the attendant process of cutting labor expenses.1
42
Although the employees were not enthusiastic about the idea,
they accepted it as the best possible solution under the cir-
cumstances. 43 According to management, the role of the em-
ployee committee members was to act as a conduit between
management and the other employees on the respective com-
140. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
141. An action committee was created for each of the following issues: (1)
Absenteeism/Infractions; (2) No Smoking Policy; (3) Communication Network;
(4) Pay Progression for Premium Positions; and, (5) Attendance Bonus Pro-
gram. Id. at 991.
142. Id. The company cut expenses by distributing an annual lump payment
based on seniority instead of wage increases as well as by changing its policy of
awarding bonuses based on attendance. Id. at 990. Employees petitioned man-
agement to express their disappointment with the policy changes in response to
which the company met with a group of eight employees, who were either ran-
domly selected or had affirmatively requested permission to attend the meeting,
to discuss the problems. Id. Following this meeting, the company's president
again met with other members of management and concluded that unilateral
management action would no longer satisfy the employees and that the best
course was to involve employees in solving the problems whereupon the "action
committees" were established. Id. at 991.
143. Id.
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mittee topics. 144 Management determined the composition of
each committee, its responsibilities and goals, the meeting
dates, the topics of discussion, and also provided the materi-
als and location for the meetings. 145 Employees were paid for
their participation, and a member of management was pres-
ent at every meeting "to facilitate the discussions."146 After
the commencement of an organizational drive, the employer
discontinued working with the committees.
147
The NLRB found first that the committees were labor or-
ganizations within the meaning of section 2(5) because: (1)
employees participated on the committees; (2) the activities of
the committees constituted "dealings" with the employer
since proposals were submitted and would have been imple-
mented but for the onset of the union campaign; (3) the sub-
ject matter of the committees generally consisted of condi-
tions of employment; and (4) the committees acted in a
representational capacity. 148 The NLRB also found that the
employer had dominated the committees since it had formed
the committees despite employee ambivalence, defined the
functions and topics of the committees, contributed support,
and appointed management members to serve on the commit-
tees.149 In conclusion, the NLRB determined that the pur-
pose of the committees was not to enable cooperation to im-
prove quality or efficiency, but to create the false impression
that employee demands were being met or at least consid-
ered.1 50 This sort of company unionism through unilateral
bargaining or "dealing" was the very problem which section
8(a)(2) was enacted to address.15 1
Three members of the NLRB concurred with Chairman
Stephens' opinion, but wrote separately to propose less re-
strictive interpretations of the NLRA in order to allow for
greater latitude in labor-management cooperation. NLRB
144. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 991 (1992), enforced, Electroma-
tion, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 992.
148. Id. at 997.
149. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 (1992), enforced, Electroma-
tion, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
These management controls were inconsistent with the structural indepen-





Member Devaney's concurrence 152 emphasized the represen-
tative nature of a labor organization, such that a joint labor-
management committee would unlawfully impede the em-
ployees' free choice of a bargaining representative. 153 NLRB
Member Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr.'s concurrence15 4 recommended
an exception to the rule for joint committees addressing "sig-
nificant productivity and efficiency problems in the work-
place" since these subjects are outside the usual topics of bar-
gaining.155 NLRB Member John Neil Raudabaugh proposed
a four-part test for determining the nature of a joint labor-
management committee. 156 The factors of the four-part test
included the assessment of (1) the extent of the employer's
involvement; (2) whether the employees objectively perceive
the joint committee as a substitute for traditional collective
bargaining; (3) whether the employees have been assured of
their section 7 right to representation and collective bargain-
ing; and (4) the employer's motive in establishing the commit-
tee. 1 57 Electromation, Inc. appealed this decision but the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the decision on
September 15, 1994.158
2. E.I. du Pont
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,159 the company unilat-
erally instituted seven committees to address fitness and
safety issues at the 3500-employee chemical plant without
152. Id. at 998-1003 (Devaney, M., concurring).
153. Id. at 990, 999 (Devaney, M., concurring).
154. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1003-05 (1992) (Oviatt, M., con-
curring), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612
(7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1005-15 (Raudabaugh, M., concurring).
157. Id. at 1013 (Raudabaugh, M., concurring).
158. Electromation v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15,
1994). Counsel for Electromation argued during the September 27, 1993, hear-
ing that the subjective wishes of the employees who participate in the commit-
tees should factor into the analysis of the legality of the committees and that
the NLRB's conclusion undermines employees' freedom of choice. See Randall
Samborn, Seventh Circuit Panel Hears Electromation Appeal, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
11, 1993, at 17. The Seventh Circuit did not address the issue of whether mod-
ern labor-management cooperation groups were unlawful under the NLRA
since it found that the NLRA's determination was supported by substantial evi-
dence and its legal conclusions were reasonably based in the law. Electroma-
tion v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612, *68-*75 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
159. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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negotiating with the incumbent union. 16 0 Once again, the
main question, for the purpose of finding whether the com-
mittees were "labor organizations," was whether they were
"dealing" with the employer under the Cabot Carbon test.
16 1
E.I. du Pont broadly defined the term "dealing" to mean a
"bilateral mechanism" which entails a pattern or practice of
proposals to management, although no compromise on either
side is required.162 The NLRB held that isolated instances of
proposals to management did not count as "dealing," nor did
"brainstorming" sessions, information sharing, or individual
communications with management. 16
3
The employer's control over the committees assured a
finding that it dominated the committees.16  This control
was demonstrated by management's participation in commit-
tee decision-making, formation of one of the committees, de-
termination of committee agendas and topics for discussion,
determination of the number of employees on each committee
and selection of employee participants on the committees if
the number of volunteers exceeded the number of available
spaces. 165 Further, the management could "change or abolish
any of the committees at will."1 66 The near complete lack of
independent structure resulting in virtual employer control
of the committee constituted a perfect illustration of the New-
port News standard for employer domination of the formation
and administration of a labor organization under NLRA sec-
tion 8(a)(2). 167
Chairman Stephens, the author of the Electromation de-
cision, was recused from participating in this decision, and
only NLRB Member Devaney wrote separately in concur-
rence. NLRB Member Devaney diverged from his colleagues
160. Id. at 900 (Devaney, M., concurring).
161. Id. at 894.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895-96 (1993).
165. Id. at 895-96.
166. Id. at 896.
167. Id. The NLRB held that E.I. du Pont did not violate NLRA § 8(a)(5) by
holding safety conferences since these conferences were mere "brainstorming"
sessions in which suggestions and ideas regarding safety were discussed. This
did not constitute bilateral "dealing" with the employer since the conferences
were not meant to establish proposals. Id. Further, the conferences did not
address bargainable matters and it was made clear that such matters should be
handled through the union. Id.
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by subscribing to a narrower interpretation of "labor organi-
zation," allowing significant opportunity for labor-manage-
ment cooperation efforts to serve as management tools so
long as the committees did not usurp the role of a labor or-
ganization by purporting to represent employees in bargain-
ing with the employer. 168 Under this theory, the chief evil
sought to be eradicated by section 8(a)(2) was employer ma-
nipulation of labor-management cooperation efforts "so that
they appear to be agents and representatives of the employ-
ees when in fact they are not" which would undermine em-
ployee free choice in choosing a bargaining agent.169 Thus, a
labor-management cooperation committee would not be un-
lawful, even if dominated by the employer, unless it acted in
a representational capacity. The concurrence contended that
the majority's definition of "dealing with" as a bilateral mech-
anism of proposal submission by committees and acceptance
by management was tantamount to "bargaining with" and so
the E.I. du Pont committees were thus unlawfully acting as
employee representation committees.
1 70
E.I. du Pont did not appeal this decision and has abol-
ished the offending committees. 171 The company's managing
counsel has stated that "it's not formalized committees that




In Electromation and E.I. du Pont, the NLRB rigorously
applied the traditional two-part test (domination/labor organ-
ization) to obliging facts and, not surprisingly, found 8(a)(2)
168. Id. at 898-900 (Devaney, M., concurring).
169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 899-900 (Devaney,
M., concurring).
170. Id. at 902 n.10 (Devaney, M., concurring). NLRB Member Devaney dif-
ferentiated "dealing with" and "bargaining with" by reference to the legislative
history of the NLRA, showing that NLRA § 2(5) was worded so as to include
false bargaining as well as bargaining. Id. See the testimony of William Green
referenced by Member Devaney in Electromation: "[Flew of the company union
plans in themselves pretend to be an agency for collective bargaining. Show me
a company union through which a wage agreement... has ever been consum-
mated. Never one." To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926
Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 72
(1934) (statement of William Green, President of the American Federation of
Labor), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 102.
171. See Samborn, supra note 13, at 1.
172. Id.
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violations. In both cases, the committees were clearly labor
organizations since they acted in a representational capacity
regarding conditions of employment. The employer domi-
nated the committees by controlling significant aspects con-
cerning the formation of the committees and the conduct of
meetings. Given these facts, evocative of company unionism,
the NLRB must have felt little need to narrow the 8(a)(2)
standards that had been observed, with few exceptions, since
the NLRA was enacted. The concurring members in both
cases suggested alternative tests which would recognize valid
labor-management cooperation while continuing to restrict
sham unions, in their modern guises, by refocusing the in-
quiry from the traditional employer domination/labor organi-
zation test to whether the role of the union had actually been
threatened or usurped.
Despite this, the NLRB did provide further clarification
of the Cabot Carbon "dealing with employers" standard for
labor organizations by explaining it as a "bilateral mecha-
nism" in which proposals are submitted by employees as a
group and accepted by management. Unfortunately, this
clarification provides no exception for legitimate labor-man-
agement cooperation efforts, many of which, because of their
joint nature and the need for mutual communication and con-
tribution, simply do not qualify as unilateral mechanisms.
III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
A. Opposing Perspectives on Labor-Management
Cooperation
In general, the current theory supporting labor-manage-
ment cooperation is that labor and management now, more
than in times past, have common interests, namely counter-
acting the dual threats of foreign competition and a destabi-
lized employment relationship. 1 73 Beginning in the late
1970's, interest in labor-management cooperation grew expo-
nentially as American businesses began experimenting with
methods to increase productivity so as to remain globally
competitive. 174 During this same period of time, union mem-
173. See generally GOULD, supra note 10, at 11-17; Stephen I. Schlossberg &
Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Coop-
eration, 3 LAB. LAW. 11, 17 (1987); Randolph M. Hale, The New Industrial Rela-
tions in a Global Economy, 37 LAB. L.J. 539 (1986).
174. See BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 2, at 146.
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bership had declined contemporaneously with the decline in
manufacturing and industrial work, and the rise in the per-
centage of service sector jobs less amenable to unioniza-
tion.175 One general result of these trends was a marked de-
crease in the stability of the employment relationship. 176 In
clarifying the standards for a lawful labor-management coop-
erative effort, it is necessary to remember that the Supreme
Court has remarked that "Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal part-
ner in the running of the business enterprise in which the
union members are employed." 77 Realistically then, current
labor-management cooperation efforts are primarily an eco-
nomic management tool with secondary ameliorative social
and economic benefits for employees.1
78
1. Overview of Theories of Labor-Management
Cooperation
Labor-management cooperation efforts vary depending
on the context of the workplace in which they are enacted, as
well as on the different theories and models of labor-manage-
ment cooperation in use.' 79 "Cooperation" can denote any-
thing from unilateral methods, such as suggestion boxes and
employee opinion surveys, to co-management of the business
by employees.' 0 However, the very term "labor-management
cooperation" presupposes some significant degree of mutual
communication and contact between management and labor.
Further, labor-management cooperation efforts are almost al-
ways initiated and supported to some degree by management
175. See id., supra note 2, at 4-5; GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
176. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 259-60.
177. First Natl Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
178. One commentator has noted that the origins of labor-management coop-
eration are based on a "moral issue of equality" between labor and management
rather than a means to achieve an economic end. E.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Mod-
els of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27
B.C. L. REV. 499, 501 (1986). In the United States, however, labor-management
cooperation has always been perceived as a management theory and has come
to serve the purposes of management first whereas the European model of la-
bor-management cooperation is based on socialist ideology which has perme-
ated the law. See id. at 501 n.5.
179. See id. at 503-05.
180. See id. at 505-10.
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since they are most often to the immediate benefit of
management. 181
The context of the workplace plays a large part in deter-
mining the level and quality of cooperation. In addition to
the unionization factor, the context of the workplace also in-
cludes the type of work done and the structure and size of the
business. Several widely recognized "models" of labor-man-
agement cooperation have emerged based on a variety of the-
ories which have been propounded over the course of the last
two decades. 182 Different "models" are associated with differ-
ent types of workplaces and business enterprises. 183 Each of
these models provides employees some greater level of contri-
bution to the success of the business, beyond the parameters
of their individual job classifications. 1 4 Such involvement
would rarely be available through the traditional collective
bargaining process. 1 5
2. Union, Employer, and Employee Perspectives
Despite the widely touted advantages of labor-manage-
ment cooperation, well-warranted skepticism remains on the
181. See id. at 546. Professor Kohler argues that while properly instituted
participatory programs can produce benefits for all the parties involved, they
should not be allowed to pose as an alternative to collective bargaining given
the conflict of interest presented by management involvement and control. Id.
at 547-48. Professor Kohler notes that, historically, "employer-sponsored alter-
natives to collective bargaining have not sufficed" because management retains
ultimate control. Id. at 550. Collective bargaining promotes independent em-
ployee association which, in turn, decreases reliance on government interven-
tion in the employment relationship while promoting an organized political
voice for labor. Id. Thus, Professor Kohler concludes that collective bargaining
must be preserved by the vigilant enforcement of section 8(a)(2). Id. at 551.
This Comment agrees that the values of collective bargaining, including prohi-
bition of company union-like constructs, must remain intact. However, this
comment argues that ignoring practical and well-tested solutions to modern
economic realities will ultimately work to the detriment of all parties, and that
a compromise position is possible.
182. Id. at 505-10. Professor Kohler identifies six commonly used models;
the quality circle, job enrichment programs, semi-autonomous teams, opinion
surveys, quality of work life programs, and the Scanlon Plan. Id.
183. See id. at 510-13.
184. Id.
185. See Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation:
An Anomalous Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J.
206, 207 (1987) (discussing union challenges to labor management cooperation
techniques characterizing employee participation as "managerial," thus placing
the participating employee outside the scope of coverage of union
representation).
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part of unions, employers, and employees. The legal con-
structs developed to address the inherent adversity of the
parties present a variety of impediments to labor-manage-
ment cooperation, as do the entrenched historically opposed
interests of the parties. 18 6 It is important to understand the
concerns of the three main players in this developing area of
labor law in order to appreciate the impact of the proposed
resolutions.
Historical union opposition to company unions, the main
tools by which employers legally established dominion over
their employees prior to 1935,187 has fueled modern union
suspicions about the rationale behind many current labor-
management cooperation efforts.1 88  The committees and
teams established in the name of cooperation are viewed by
unions, frequently with good reason, as attempts to usurp the
union's role as the employees' representative. 189 The commit-
tees in Electromation and E.I. du Pont are illustrative of the
types of ill-conceived labor-management efforts that appear
to be merely an end-run around the authority of the union. 190
In the non-union sector, committees established ostensibly to
promote labor-management cooperation are often no more
than managerial attempts to maintain a union-free work-
place. 191 Although the Electromation committees were dis-
continued at the commencement of the organizational drive,
while in existence, they were found to have been labor organi-
zations dominated by the employer, thus usurping the proper
role, and perhaps discouraging the existence, of a duly elected
union.192 Union suspicions about labor-management cooper-
ation are further fueled by the fact that these efforts are
186. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 32-38 (discussing problems
arising from labor-management cooperation efforts and the exclusivity doctrine,
the duty to disclose information, the distinction between mandatory and per-
missive subjects of bargaining, and the duty of fair representation, among
others). See generally GOULD, supra note 10.
187. See supra part II.B.1.
188. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 25.
189. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
190. See generally Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced,
Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15,
1994); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
191. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
192. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B at 998.
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nearly always initiated by the employer, the union's tradi-
tional adversary. 19 3
In addition to concerns shared by all parties about
whether labor-management cooperation is feasible or worth
the effort in a particular workplace, employers are generally
concerned about the usurpation of management prerogatives
by employees.19 4 Not only do labor-management cooperation
efforts require including employees in formulating traditional
management decisions regarding personnel functions, prod-
uct quality, and the work setting, but negotiating these ef-
forts with unions may require concessions to the union by
management. 195 Furthermore, many management experts
suspect that any legislative revision to allow for labor-man-
agement cooperation cannot be accomplished without conces-
sionary revisions to other parts of the Act. 196 As with unions,
the employer's willingness to compromise on some level is re-
quired for the success of labor-management cooperation.
Employees also have several concerns about labor-man-
agement cooperation. First, employee involvement in "man-
agerial" decisions may pose the danger of changing the status
of the individuals involved to the extent that they are no
longer covered by the NLRA.19v Second, employee involve-
ment may also threaten a violation of the exclusivity doc-
trine.198 Third, labor-management cooperation is primarily a
193. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 550.
194. See BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 2 at 167. Bluestone also notes
a potential increase in costs associated with operating the committees, id. at
166, and that "management is often skeptical of labor's ability to co-manage the
workplace." Id. at 167.
195. Under First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), cer-
tain decisions were found to be the prerogative of management and not subject
to mandatory bargaining. Id. at 670. Thus, employers would not be required to
bargain about employee involvement in these areas.
196. Professor Gould advocates that "such reforms should not be undertaken
independent of labor law amendments that give unions access to company prop-
erty to engage in organizational campaigns and representative status even
when the majority rule is not provided-as well as other far-reaching reforms."
See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262.
197. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), established that univer-
sity professors were not employees under the NLRA because of the "manage-
rial" aspects of their jobs. Id. at 682. Managerial employees are excluded from
coverage under the NLRA in the wake of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 275 (1974), overruled in part by, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
198. Section 159(a) states that "[rlepresentatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
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management tool, and the secondary economic and social
benefits for the employees may not materialize unless em-
ployee involvement is implemented fairly.199 Lastly, labor-
management cooperation may be used for no better purpose
than to mollify employees into believing that their concerns
are actually being addressed.2 °°
3. Summary
This brief survey of the general theories and competing
concerns regarding labor-management cooperation should
help to provide some context for the various proposals which
address this problem. Although the theory of labor-manage-
ment cooperation is still in its nascent stage, overwhelming
support for the notion from employers and employees favors
providing the parties with a viable legal choice. However,
any revision to or reinterpretation of the current law will re-
quire compromise on all sides; the traditional adversaries,
unions and employers, will need to yield aspects of their his-
torical privileges, and employees will need to recognize that
the benefits they derive from labor-management cooperation
are secondary to the success of the business enterprise which
makes such benefits possible.
B. Judicial Resolution
The first set of proposals analyzed are judicial resolu-
tions. The assumption of the free choice theory of judicial res-
olution is that labor-management cooperation is still possible
under one or more alternative readings of the current law.
20 1
None of the proposed alternative readings, however, have
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
199. It has been noted that employees may simply be asked to work harder
but not smarter, that the company may use the resulting efficiency gains to
reduce the workforce, and that such programs may foster dissension among fac-
tions of employees supporting and opposing the programs. See BLUESTONE &
BLUESTONE, supra note 2, at 167.
200. In E.I. du Pont, Member Devaney observed that this situation under-
mined the employee's free choice of a bargaining representative, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 898 (1993), in that management was "on
both sides of the bargaining table." Id. at 903.
201. See generally Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985) [here-
inafter Participatory Management].
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been accepted by the NLRB or validated by the U.S. Supreme
Court (as has the traditional two-part test), and probably will
not be, absent some Congressional imprimatur to depart from
the traditional adversarial system. This is especially true in
the wake of Electromation and E.I. du Pont, and given the
unresolved practical applications of the issue.2 °2 The as-
sumption under the traditional theory of judicial resolution is
that the current law supports labor-management cooperation
efforts to the extent they are useful, and that judicial reinter-
pretation is contrary to the legislative history of the
NLRA. 203
1. The Cooperative Free Choice Interpretations of the
NLRA
The traditional adversarial analysis leaves little opportu-
nity for meaningful labor-management cooperation. Accord-
ingly, alternative interpretations of the NLRA have devel-
oped in some of the circuit courts. The rationale behind these
alternative interpretations is that employees should be able
to freely choose, without government intervention via the
NLRB, the method by which they will be represented.20 4
This theory is developed in alternative interpretations of both
NLRA sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5).
202. See supra part III.A.
203. See generally Kohler, supra note 178; Note, Collective Bargaining as an
Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1662 (1983) [hereinafter
Collective Bargaining].
204. See generally Participatory Management, supra note 201. The free
choice analysis assumes that the primary purpose of the NLRA was not the
prevention of industrial strife but the protection of employee rights and that
instead of adopting a purely adversarial system, the NLRA contemplated giving
employees a choice between cooperation or adversarial relations. Id. at 1759-
60. Although legitimate labor-management cooperation is distinguishable from
company unions in their modern guises, such efforts are judged by the same set
of standards. Free choice judicial interpretations distinguish legitimate labor-
management cooperation efforts from modern day company unions by deter-
mining whether they serve a representative purpose as opposed to "those which
merely offer workers more control over and participation in managerial func-
tions." Id. at 1768.
258 [Vol. 35
1994] LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
a. The NLRA Section 8(a)(2) Subjective Test2 5
The alternative interpretation of section 8(a)(2) allows
for greater latitude for labor-management cooperation by
adopting a subjective test, from the employees' perspective, to
determine employer domination.2"6 This test requires a
showing that the employer has interfered with the employees'
freedom of choice in order to distinguish cooperation from
domination. The subjective test is more narrow, in that ac-
tual domination, rather than the inference of domination,
must be demonstrated, a requirement which could prove
problematic in application. The subjective test further frus-
trates a finding of domination, even where justified, since, by
the time litigation begins, the labor-management cooperation
effort is already in place and employees may not recognize
that it was not freely chosen. Lastly, this test is inconsistent
with legislative history and has only the most tenuous link to
established precedent.2 °7
b. The NLRA Section 2(5) Labor Organization
Test
The Sixth Circuit has reinterpreted the term "labor or-
ganization" specifically to allow for labor-management coop-
eration if it resulted from the free choice of employees, even
where there is objective evidence of employer domination.2 °8
In doing so, the court essentially rejected the holding of Cabot
Carbon.2 °9 While Cabot Carbon established a broad interpre-
205. See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
Note that the Electromation decision was enforced in the Seventh Circuit, the
same court which originated this test in 1955. Electromation v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir., Sept. 15, 1994). In Electromation v. NLRB
the Seventh Circuit stated that, "an interpretation of Section 8(a)(2) which
would limit a court's focus to only the employees' subjective will, or which would
require a finding of employee dissatisfaction with the organization, is at odds
with the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Newport News." Id. at *61-*62.
The court stated that Chicago Rawhide was distinguished from Electromation
on its facts since the employees initiated the labor-management process and
established its procedures, and their meetings were outside the presence of
management. Id. at *66.
206. See supra part II.C.2.
207. The legislative history of section 8(a)(2) is clearly concerned with main-
taining a balance between adversaries, see supra part II.B. 1, and Newport News
established clear precedent on the issue of domination. See supra part II.C.1.
208. See supra part II.C.4.
209. The Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish Cabot Carbon by observing
that the Court had not identified the specific limits of the term "dealing" other
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tation of the "dealing with" clause of section 2(5) to promote
union autonomy and the preservation of the balance of power
between employees and employers, Streamway and Air-
stream attempt to narrow this interpretation to instances in-
volving an "active, ongoing association between management
and employees."2 1 ° Other subjective and objective factors in
identifying a labor organization are suggested, as well as evi-
dence of the employer's attempt to undermine the employees'
free choice. 211 For the same reasons as the subjective section
8(a)(2) test, the reinterpreted section 2(5) test is not well sup-
ported by legislative history.21 2 The legislative history is pre-
occupied with the elimination of company unions to promote
employee free choice, not with the promotion of employee free
choice to eliminate company unions.2 13 Further, in undercut-
ting Cabot Carbon's broad definition of "dealing," this test
has only the most tenuous link to long-established precedent.
Generally, employers favor judicial resolution over the
8(a)(2) and 2(5) tests because it affords them greater freedom
to implement labor-management cooperation programs.21 4
However, judicial resolution efforts to allow for labor-man-
agement cooperation have been less than entirely success-
ful. 21 5 There does not appear to be a united front on this is-
sue at the NLRB. The concurring NLRB members in
Electromation and E.L du Pont sought to allow for greater
labor-management cooperation by reinterpreting the term
"labor organization."216 Further, the new Chairman of the
than to state the term included more than bargaining. NLRB v. Streamway
Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1982). Thus, the cir-
cuit courts were free to make this definition themselves. Id. The facts of Cabot
Carbon were essentially the same as those in Streamway but the Streamway
court attempted to distinguish the two cases on the ground that the Cabot Car-
bon committee "involved a more active, ongoing association between manage-
ment and employees." Id. at 294. Actually, the Streamway committee would
have continued to exist but for the NLRB's disestablishment order.
210. Id. at 294.
211. Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291, 1295 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v.
Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1982).
212. See supra part II.B.2.
213. See supra part II.B.2.
214. See Moskal, supra note 7, at 18.
215. Alternative tests have been developed in the First, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, none of which has proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court and all
of which rest on fairly shaky precedential ground and an unorthodox reading of
the legislative history of the NLRA. See supra, parts II.C.2 and II.C.4.
216. See supra notes 152-58, 168-70 and accompanying text.
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NLRB, William B. Gould IV, is strongly in favor of promoting
labor-management cooperation through these alternative ju-
dicial resolutions or legislative revisions patterned after
them.
2 17
2. The Traditional Adversarial Interpretation of the
NLRA
According to the traditional adversarial model, the pri-
mary goal underlying the passage of the NLRA was the pre-
vention of industrial strife, not the promotion of employee
free choice. 218  This goal was accomplished by establishing a
system in which the adversarial relations of the parties could
be resolved relatively peaceably. 219 Thus, promotion of em-
ployee associational rights was the means for reaching the
primary goal of resolving industrial strife, rather than the
end itself. Proponents of this view argue that the framework
of collective bargaining provides the only viable opportunity
for labor-management cooperation. 220 This view rests on two
assumptions. First, it assumes that labor and management
are inherent adversaries.22 ' Second, it assumes that effective
collective bargaining requires that each party maintain its
autonomy so that the balance of power is not skewed so as to
lead to industrial strife.222 Section 8(a)(2) assures this auton-
omy "by requiring that labor relations be conducted only by
organizations capable of engaging in arm's-length bargain-
ing."223 The argument follows that if this is no longer the
case, then Congress should revise the statute and the NLRB
217. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262 ("The reforms can be undertaken both
through Board and judicial interpretations of the statute as well as congres-
sional amendments to it."); see also William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers'
Participation, Influence and Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations,
58 U. CiNc. L. REV. 381, 385 (1989).
218. See Collective Bargaining, supra note 203, at 1673.
219. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding
that the NLRA is constitutional because of its purpose of promoting industrial
peace to protect interstate commerce); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HiST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2300 ("The first
objective of the bill is to promote industrial peace.").
220. See Kohler, supra note 178. "What the term worker participation (and
industrial democracy) meant to the framers of the Act ... is clear: collective
bargaining." Id. at 548.
221. See Collective Bargaining, supra note 203, at 1677-78. See also, Kohler,
supra note 178, at 515.
222. See Collective Bargaining, supra note 203, at 1674-76.
223. Id. at 1678.
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and the courts should not construe the statute in a way that
is inconsistent with its stated purpose. 224
The need to maintain union independence and autonomy
from the employer is crucial to the traditional adversary in-
terpretation, because it allows employees to engage in arms-
length bargaining with their employer. 225 The rigorous appli-
cation of the two-part test (employer domination/labor organ-
ization) ensures that employers will not usurp the role of the
union by establishing a company union in its place. Accord-
ing to this theory, company unionism continues to thrive in
the form of labor-management committees which are incon-
sistent with the basic purpose of the NLRA because they pur-
port to serve the same purpose as a union, albeit under man-
agement control.226 Further, it is correctly noted that the
rationale behind these new "company unions" originates with
management, and, while not necessarily overtly hostile to-
wards employee rights as in earlier times, is primarily for the
economic benefit of the company with secondary benefits for
the employees.227
Certain limited types of labor-management cooperation
have, however, been identified as being compatible with the
collective bargaining model. The NLRB has narrowed its
broad definition of a "labor organization" by finding two ex-
ceptions to the rule in circumstances that suggest some re-
solve to promote labor-management cooperation. 228 Further-
more, as discussed in E.I. du Pont, certain unilateral
mechanisms, such as "brainstorming" groups, suggestion
224. See id. at 1680-81. "Major revision of a social compact such as the Act is
a job for Congress, not for the courts." Id. at 1680.
225. See id. at 1674-76.
226. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 548. Professor Kohler concludes that
several popular forms of labor-management cooperation (joint worker-manage-
ment bodies, semi-autonomous teams) constitute labor organizations due to
their inevitable dealing with the employer and are dominated by the employer
because of their lack of structural independence. Id. at 535-45.
227. See id. at 547. "[P]articipative theories have been formulated on man-
agement's behalf and are intended to secure worker cooperation and identity
with the goals and directives of their employers." Id. "As the experience of
every industrialized nation reveals, managements' [sic] control of the order of
the employment relationship has not been a regime acceptable to most workers
.... Employer-sponsored alternatives to collective bargaining have not sufficed
because under them, management retains ultimate control of the order of the
relationship." Id. at 550.




boxes, information sharing, and other individual communica-
tions with management, are lawful forms of labor-manage-
ment cooperation.2 29 Lastly, it is acknowledged that,
"[u]nder the right conditions," if a union is present, labor-
management cooperation efforts can be beneficial so long as
management acknowledges the union's role as representa-
tive.23 0 Thus, some limited cooperative efforts may still be
viable under the traditional interpretation of the NLRA.
The traditional adversarial view disapproves of the more
"cooperative" forms of labor-management cooperation and of
judicial attempts to resolve the issue. The Electromation and
E.I. du Pont decisions are consistent with this view given the
straightforward application of the two-part test. For obvious
reasons, unions generally favor this view because of the sup-
port it lends their traditional role. But employers who wish
to implement some form of labor-management cooperation
are faced with a confusing variety of judicial interpretations




Given the widespread support for, and success of, labor-
management cooperation efforts and the unlikelihood of judi-
cial resolution in the wake of Electromation and E.I. du Pont,
the inevitable option is legislative resolution. Several alter-
natives exist. One alternative that has been suggested is the
complete repeal of section 8(a)(2). Another alternative is the
revision of either section 8(a)(2) or section 2(5), allowing for a
more modern understanding of unlawful domination of labor
organizations. These alternatives are explored below.
1. Repeal of NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
The argument for the repeal of section 8(a)(2) rests on
the assumption that labor-management cooperation and the
legislative principles that underlie section 8(a)(2) are en-
tirely incompatible and cannot be synthesized within the pro-
229. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
230. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 527.
231. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 237.
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* 232vision. The argument for repeal is supported by a tradi-
tional reading of the NLRA and a rejection of the free-choice
judicial resolution analysis. 233 Another assumption underly-
ing the repeal argument is that the benefits of section 8(a)(2)
are outweighed by the burdens imposed by obstructing labor-
management cooperation.23 4 The repeal argument concludes
that section 8(a)(2) could be eliminated from the NLRA alto-
gether and that section 8(a)(1) would provide sufficient pro-
tection for employees from actual employer domination. 235
Section 8(a)(2) was enacted specifically to eliminate the
prevalent problems associated with company unions.236 The
primary threat posed by company unions was the appearance
of impartial representation which threatened any meaningful
opportunity for collective bargaining. 2 7 Although many sup-
porters of labor-management cooperation insist that the com-
pany union no longer exists,238 cases such as E.I. du Pont and
Electromation, with their representational committees, prove
otherwise. It is somewhat naive to believe that a grudgingly
acknowledgment of the need for labor-management coopera-
tion efforts will eliminate partisan impulses and automati-
cally result in harmonious cooperation on all levels. Obvi-
ously, the adversarial nature of labor-management relations
perseveres despite the recent realization of some common in-
terests brought on by external forces. Labor-management ef-
forts should be acknowledged as a management tool, which
has the potential to be abused to the detriment of employees.
Section 8(a)(2) should remain substantially intact in or-
der to continue to counteract the very abuse it was designed
to prevent.23 9 Section 8(a)(1) 240 cannot adequately address
232. See Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor
Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2038-
41 (1987).
233. See id. at 2034-38.
234. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 153; Clarke, supra note 232, at 2044-49
(examining beneficial social and economic implications of repeal).
235. See Clarke, supra note 232, at 2040-41. "Employer domination or coer-
cion would clearly 'interfere with' and 'restrain' employees, and would thus vio-
late section 8(a)(1)." Id. at 2041.
236. See supra part II.B.1.
237. See supra part II.A.
238. See Gould, supra note 217, at 384 (1989); see also Participatory Manage-
ment, supra note 201, at 1749.
239. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 25 (arguing that there is
an obvious need to preserve genuine prohibitions on company unions "and to
proscribe the use by unscrupulous employers of spurious cooperative or partici-
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the ongoing problem of company unions. Employer domina-
tion of a labor organization could easily be characterized as
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of their section 7 rights under section 8(a)(1); but so
could the three other section 8(a) unlawful employer activi-
ties,241 for which reason section 8(a)(1) is a derivative claim
under each of them.242 The other section 8(a) violations re-
tain their primary status because of the essentially adver-
sarial nature of the labor-management relations and because
of the continuing categories of abuses which make specific
reference to them necessary. Such is the case with section
8(a)(2). The acknowledgment of the mutual need for some co-
operation in the workplace does not signal an end to the in-
herently adversarial relations between labor and
management.
2. Legislative Revision of NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
The proponents of revising section 8(a)(2) argue that
even if certain judicial resolutions are supportable, the rigor-
ous enforcement of the traditional test by the NLRB and the
majority of the circuit courts makes legislative revision the
best option.243 Other proponents argue that the judicial reso-
lutions are not supportable and that legislative revision of
section 8(a)(2) is the only option.244 Either way, any proposal
for revision should examine the judicial resolutions as the
policy road maps to successful legislative resolution.
pative schemes conceived as means to defeat legitimate efforts at union
organization.").
240. This section provides that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer- to (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the[ir] rights guaranteed in section [7] .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
241. These sections provide that,
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee be-
cause he has filed charges or given testimony under this
subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)]....
Id. §§ 158(a)(3)-(5).
242. See, e.g., SMrrH et al., supra note 49, at 76.
243. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 140-41.
244. See Collective Bargaining, supra note 203, at 1680-81.
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Judicial resolution of section 8(a)(2) calls for two things:
a finding of actual domination by the employer based on a
subjective test from the employees' point of view; and an as-
sessment, based on the facts, of the employer's motives. 245
The application of this theory to section 8(a)(2) would require
a showing of actual domination, a subjective and fact-based
standard.246 Accordingly, such a revision would excise most
of the illustrative terms in section 8(a)(2) to eliminate objec-
tive standards for judging labor-management cooperation. 247
This revision allows for the worst of both worlds. By ren-
dering the provision ineffective for application in actual domi-
nation cases, it also leaves the broad term "labor organiza-
tion" which could continue to eliminate a number of labor-
management cooperation efforts. Even worse, such a revision
would surely require major employer concessions, such as the
passage of legislation requiring that employers not replace
striking employees,248 which would make the bill unpalatable
to the business community and thus further impede its pas-
sage. Lastly, such a revision would require a case by case
assessment of the subjective state of mind of the employer
and the employees, placing a huge burden on the NLRB and
the court system and leaving no clear standards for employ-
ers to follow.
3. Legislative Revision of NLRA Section 2(5)
As with proposals to revise section 8(a)(2), a proposal to
revise the definition of a "labor organization" assumes that
judicial resolution is not supportable. Furthermore, such a
245. See supra part II.C.2.
246. Under the subjective test, interference with the formation, NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1211 (1st Cir. 1979), or administration,
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1974), of a labor or-
ganization need not be unlawful, any more than contributing financial or other
support, NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 546 (6th Cir. 1984).
247. Such a revision to section 8(a) could read as follows: It shall be an un-
fair libor practice for an employer-
(2) to dominate cr interfcr with the fc-mnatin zr admrAristwratifn zf
any labor organization cr .nti.but. finenial or . th. . upp t t it:
-ided, That 9ubjzt to rdiesa nd regulatiefts made end published by
the Beard ptwsuant to seeticr. 6, an emplcyer shall net be prehibitzd
frem permnitting employees te ccnfcr with Ms~ emplzyer dluriag vwcrking
heurs wt heit les f t mc er pay. Proof of such domination requires a
subjective showing of both anti-union motive on the part of the em-
ployer and employee disfavor.
248. See S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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proposal assumes that revision or repeal of section 8(a)(2) is
unnecessarily drastic given that, as one commentator has ob-
served, and as legislative history proves, this section is the
"cornerstone" of the NLRA.249 Clearly, the sticking point in
defining unlawful employer domination has been the defini-
tion of a labor organization, and not the identification of
domination.2 5 ° Once again, an examination of the policies de-
veloped in the alternative judicial resolutions provides a road
map for proposed revision.
Generally, the alternative judicial interpretations of sec-
tion 2(5) have emphasized the representative qualities of a
"labor organization" in an attempt to narrow the definition.
Under Cabot Carbon, "dealing" means more than bargaining,
but according to the alternative judicial resolutions which es-
tablished the outer limits of this definition, it is no more than
representation, and is not an unlimited proscription against
communication between employers and employees. 251 The
NLRB has allowed limited exceptions to the broad definition
of a labor organization for committees that do not act as
agents of the employees, or where the committees act for
management, rather than with management.25 2 Both of
these exceptions constitute non-representative action. The
Sixth Circuit interpretation further refines the term "deal-
ing" in section 2(5) to allow for interaction between manage-
ment and labor which is no more than a communication de-
vice, not active and ongoing, nor a vehicle for
representation.253
Thus, a revision to section 2(5) consistent with these in-
terpretations would incorporate this narrower, but still ob-
scure, definition of a "labor organization," possibly by specifi-
cally stating that the term shall not include labor-
management committees which do act in a representational
capacity. However, such a revision to section 2(5) would not
249. Kohler, supra note 178, at 518.
250. Domination is more readily objectively ascertainable, despite the propo-
sition that it must be subjectively proven, whereas despite nearly 60 years of
trying, the definition of a labor organization is still clouded by theory. Indeed,
the Newport News Court had no trouble concluding that the committee had
been dominated, but it passed on the issue of whether the committee itself was
acceptable, leaving the issue to Congress. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuild-
ing & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
251. See supra part II.C.4.
252. See supra part II.C.5.
253. See supra part II.C.5.
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necessarily be consistent with the application of the term in
other sections of the NLRA. Accordingly, the better strategy
is to concentrate on section 8(a)(2), the source of the chal-
lenges to labor-management cooperation.
IV. PROPOSAL-AMENDMENT OF NLRA SECTION 8(a)(2)
Some commentators have attempted to provide guide-
lines for lawful labor-management cooperation efforts in light
of current judicial developments.254 Most recently, in the
wake of the Electromation decision, an article proposed a list
of common sense precautionary measures to ensure labor-
management cooperation efforts the best opportunity to resist
challenge. 255 In 1990, the United Nations Association of the
United States Economic Policy Council proposed thirteen "ge-
neric principles" for the lawful promotion of labor-manage-
ment cooperation. 256
254. Compare, e.g., Lee, supra note 185, at 219 with Zucker & Davis-Clarke,
supra note 23, at 34. During the seven year period between the two articles,
different issues and emphases have come to the fore, although several obvious
themes remain the same. For instance, where a union is present, the employer
would be well advised to negotiate labor-management cooperation efforts with
the employees via their collective bargaining representative so as not to usurp
the role of the union. And in the absence of an elected union, the establishment
of labor-management cooperation committees is governed by the need to avoid
creating labor organizations.
255. Steven H. Winterbauer, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Labor
Issues in the Nonunion Workplace, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 189 (1994). The arti-
cle proposed the following measures:
-The employer [may propose] the EPP [Employee Participation Plan]
but at the outset [should make] clear that employee participation [is]
not mandatory;
-Managers do not participate in the EPP. Alternatively, if managers
do participate, which standing alone does not violate the NLRA, the
committee is governed by majority rule and managers do not constitute
an majority;
-Employee participation is by way of open enrollment. The employer
does not limit or select nonmanagerial membership;
-The EPP selects its own chair and determines its own agenda;
-the employees participate on a nonrepresentational basis;
-The employer prohibits discussion of subjects of mandatory bargain-
ing such as grievances, wages, hours, and conditions of work;
-The employer makes clear to employees that the EPPs are not in-
tended to be a substitute for the employees right to organize and bar-
gain collectively.
Id. at 214.
256. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS (1990). These included employee involvement in the
development of the program, a genuine long-term corporate commitment to the
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Despite these clarifications and others, a great deal of
confusion remains on the part of employees as well as em-
ployers about the legal requirements of labor-management
cooperation.257 However, a joint bipartisan proposal, the
Teamwork for Employees and Management Act [hereinafter
TEAM], to amend section 8(a)(2) was introduced in the House
and the Senate in 1993.258 The introduction of the bipartisan
proposal explicitly recognized the need for labor-management
cooperation. 259 The proposal attempted to allow for labor-
management cooperation efforts while placating the various
concerns of unions, management and employees. The propo-
sal was also substantively the same as the proposed amend-
ment that was rejected during the Taft-Hartley amendments
of 1947.260
Instead of revising the existing language of either section
8(a)(2) or section 2(5), this proposal would amend section
8(a)(2) by adding a further provision recognizing labor-man-
agement cooperation efforts as lawful.261 It also understand-
program, voluntary worker participation, a focus on employee needs, participa-
tive management, training programs, a supportive corporate atmosphere, union
involvement where a union is present, and the promotion of job security and
advancement.
257. See 139 CONG. REC. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introductory state-
ment of Sen. Kassebaum on joint resolution entitled Teamwork for Employees
and Management Act of 1993).
258. See S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also H.R. 1529, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993).
259. The stated purpose of TEAM is to:
1) protect legitimate employee involvement structures against govern-
mental interference;
2) preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive employer
practices; and
3) permit legitimate employee involvement structures where workers
may discuss issues involving terms and conditions of employment, to
continue to evolve and proliferate.
See 139 CONG. REc. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
260. See supra part II.B.3; see also supra note 73 (containing text of the re-
jected amendment). This amendment was originally rejected because it was
thought to be redundant and unnecessary given minor concessions on the issue
of labor-management communication in section 9(a). There was no premium
placed on labor-management communications at the time given the compara-
tively recent spectre of company unions. Obviously, times have changed.
261. Both bills contain substantially the same amending language:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an un-
fair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish,
assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate, to discuss matters of mutual in-
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ably would attempt to circumvent the fact-based subjective
test carved out by the alternative judicial resolutions, by sim-
ply defining an acceptable labor-management cooperation or-
ganization as one which addresses matters of mutual interest
to employers and employees, and distinguishing such an or-
ganization from a section 2(5) labor organization by empha-
sizing its absolute lack of representative capacity. The pro-
posed amendment would leave the proscription against
domination intact, while revising the definition of a labor or-
ganization consistent with the judicial resolutions, and con-
fining the reach of the definition to the issue of domination.
In practice, the domination test remains as a guarantee that
the parties will continue to bargain at arms length. How-
ever, the amendment would acknowledge the existence of
other issues of mutual interest, and recognize the legality of
employer-employee groups that address issues of quality, pro-
ductivity, efficiency, and the like.
The proposed amendment would address union concerns
about continuing employer efforts to dominate labor organi-
zations, and also management concerns about having to
make concessionary revisions to other parts of the NLRA in
exchange for union concessions on this issue. Employee con-
cerns regarding the exclusivity doctrine would be addressed
by leaving section 2(5) intact and providing an exception only
regarding the issue of domination. Employee concerns about
the improper use of labor-management cooperation efforts
would be met by leaving section 8(a)(2) intact. Employee con-
cerns about their protected status under the NLRA, as well
as other legal inconsistencies arising from the limited imple-
mentation of cooperation in a traditionally adversarial rela-
tionship, would have to be addressed separately. In addition,
a legislative amendment to section 8(a)(2) would demonstrate
Congressional imprimatur of labor-management cooperation
terest, including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency, and
which does not have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into
collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any
labor organization.
Compare S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGIS. HiST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 56, supra note 73.
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Given the increasingly competitive nature of the market-
place and a better educated workforce more capable of coming
to its own decisions, employers and employees should be able
to choose whether or not to implement a labor-management
cooperation program. Legislative history, as well as the Elec-
tromation and E.L du Pont cases, signal the dubious
probability of successful judicial resolution. Additionally,
practical exigencies militate against some of the proposed leg-
islative revisions. This leaves a legislative amendment as the
only viable recourse. The publicity surrounding Electroma-
tion and E.I. du Pont may expedite legislative amendment.2
63
The proposed legislative amendment maintains the protec-
tions already in place while supporting future labor-manage-
ment cooperation efforts. The need for labor-management co-
operation will only grow with the increase in both global
competition and the non-unionized sector and the resultant
unstable employment relationships. Amending legislation
that was enacted in a different era, when the United States
was industrially preeminent, is the appropriate response to
these modern requirements.
Audrey Anne Smith
262. NLRB Member Raudabaugh has remarked, "[ilf you don't like the re-
sult, it's up to Congress to change it." Roger S. Kaplan & Margaret R. Bryant,
Employer Participation Committees: "Sham Unions" or Wave of the Future?,
LEG. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at 25.
263. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262.
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